### UNITED STATED BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

In re: Case No. 00-4397 to 00-4399LERNOUT & HAUSPIE SPEECH Adver. No. 04-54842 Debtor November 23, 2004

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDITH H. WIZNUR OUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

#### APPEARANCES:

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(Appearances continued)

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1	(Hearing in session)
2	THE COURT: Hello.
3	MR. TRENCH: Good morning, Your good afternoon,
4	Your Honor.
5	THE COURT: Good afternoon. Mr. Trench?
6	MR. TRACY: Yes, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: Yes, and I have Mr. Fallon, Ms. Nguyen,
8	Mr. Flynn, Mr. Tacconelli, and Ms. Coggins.
9	A FEMALE SPEAKER: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
10	THE COURT: Good afternoon. Mr. Trench?
11	MR. TRENCH: Yes. I'm on speaker. Can you hear me
12	clearly?
13	THE COURT: Yes, I can.
1.4	MR. TRACY: Okay. Well, this I think is is KPMG's
15	motion. I'm glad to present the argument in any fashion or
16	sequence you would like, but
17	THE COURT: But you're right. I'll gladly hear from
18	a representative of KPMG first. Who will speak for KPMG?
19	MS. NGUYEN: Your Honor, this is Suong Nguyen from
20	Davis Polk on behalf of KPMG, LLP.
21	THE COURT: Yes, Ms. Nguyen.
22	MS. NGUYEN: We made the motion, and we're
23	respectively requesting a transfer of this case to the District
24	of Massachusetts. The reason we're making this request is
25	because Massachusetts is where numerous cases that are related

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to Lernout & Hauspie have been pending and continue to be pending for several years now, the first case filed in 2000.

So when the L&H litigation trust had filed their case several months ago against KPMG, U.S. and KPMG Belgium, it was against this back -- backdrop of litigation that had been pending before Judge Saris and also before Magistrate Judge Collings in Massachusetts, and it was only by virtue of the fact that Lernout & Hauspie at the time was in bankruptcy that L&H was not named in those cases.

So the basis for our transfer is that Judge Saris and Magistrate Judge Collings have familiarity with the facts and issues that are overlapping with this case. All the Massachusetts cases relate to L&H's demise. It relates to its 1998 and 1999 financial statements and also KPMG, U.S. and KPMG, Belgium's respective role in connection with L&H's bankruptcy.

The review of the complaint in this case as compared to the complaints that have been filed in Massachusetts showed that they rely on the same documents at issue, the same factual allegations at issue, and an example of that relates to KPMG, U.S.'s role in reviewing various Korean contracts, LDC (phonetic) contracts, and similar accounting issues.

Massachusetts is also where the cases had been transferred from both the Delaware District Court and also Pennsylvania. About two years ago, Judge Robinson from the

#### Argument - Nquyen

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District of Delaware had transferred four cases that dealt with the Dictaphone and Dragon transaction to Massachusetts, and the rational for that transfer was because the other L&H related lawsuits had already been pending in Massachusetts.

The Dragon and Dictaphone transactions are the same transactions that are issue in the L&H litigation trust's action against KPMG, U.S.

THE COURT: What's your reaction to the plaintiff's argument that the first filed rule shouldn't apply here because KPMG -- there are no common parties at this point since KPMG apparently has settled all of its -- all of the claims against it, asserted against it in the Massachusetts actions?

First, with respect to the fact that KPMG, U.S. and KPMG, Belgium have settled or are in the process of finalizing the settlements of the Massachusetts action, it really misses the point, because our basis for transfer is because Judge Saris and Magistrate Judge Collings had familiarity with the issues here which the trust conceived are overlapping with those in this case.

With respect to the first filed rule and the fact that they're different parties or different theories, we cited numerous cases in our reply brief which show that courts have — have transferred cases where there are different parties and different legal theories at issue, and, in fact, the Filler case, which is the one by Judge Robinson, the District of

# Argument - Nguyen

Delaware, when Judge Robinson transferred the Dictaphone and Dragon cases, they dealt with different legal theories, and the Baker, Filler, all those other plaintiffs were not plaintiffs in the Massachusetts action.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

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MS. NGUYEN: So we think that the law is very clear that it -- it's -- it's of no moment that the parties or the legal theories in this case are -- are not the same, because Judge Collings and Saris have gone through the same issues that would be relevant here. These issues, for instance, relate to KPMG, Belgium's production of documents. There's Belgium secrecy issues at stake. We -- KPMG, U.S. has also produced documents in the Massachusetts case, and we had various motions about the scope of our production before Judge Collings already.

In addition, other parties, including ourselves, have produced documents in the case, and those documents are governed by a confidentiality agreement that Judge Collings has entered. So that if there's any disputes about the designation of certain documents as confidential or transcripts of depositions that would quote from those documents as confidential, Judge Collings would be the one overseeing that, and we expect the same issues that, you know, were presented in the Massachusetts case to be presented here.

The other reason why Massachusetts makes sense is

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because the trustee in this case concedes that Massachusetts is the center of gravity of the alleged conduct in this case, and there are numerous witnesses who are present in Massachusetts. L&H's U.S. offices was in Massachusetts. There's a claim by the litigation trustee for the -- violation of the Massachusetts consumer protection statute. There's allegations that the auditing functions at issue here occurred in Massachusetts.

So I -- we think that that is the reason why several months ago the trustee had initially agreed to transfer, and while the trustee has a right to change its mind, we submit that the basis for transfer remains the same here.

The last thing I would add, Your Honor, is that since our transfer motion had been filed, Judge Robinson of the District of Delaware had withdrawn the reference with respect to a core proceeding. It was a preference complaint that the trust had filed against KPMG, U.S. And so this suggests that in this particular case, which is a noncore case dealing with prepetition events, that there would also be a withdraw of the reference and that this case really should probably belong on the district court, and we submit it should be transferred to the District Court of Massachusetts.

THE COURT: Uh-huh. Understood. Mr. Trench, will you be speaking on behalf of the -- or Mr. Tacconelli?

MR. TRENCH: I will, Your Honor. This is David

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# Argument - Trench

Trench. I'll speak on behalf of the trustee.

THE COURT: All right. What about the jury trial situation? I didn't see that taken up in the papers.

MR. TRENCH: We -- we briefly took it up, Your Honor, and it was to the point that the jury trial issue is not a transfer motion consideration. The question that KPMG poses is should this case be tried in Delaware or Massachusetts. If there's --

THE COURT: What --

MR. TRENCH: -- a right to a jury trial and the Bankruptcy Court in Delaware is not empowered to conduct a jury trial, then the proper remedy for the one seeking the jury trial is to withdraw the reference from the Bankruptcy Court to the District Court in Delaware.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. TRENCH: It has nothing to do with whether or not this case more properly belongs in Massachusetts or in Delaware. So with respect to the issue in front of the Court today, which is should the case be transferred to Delaware, the fact that they have a right to a jury trial, which they have not yet asserted, but the fact that they have a right to one is not a factor in whether or not Massachusetts should be the venue or Delaware should be the venue.

So I think that's a red herring, if you will. not something which should weigh in your determination about

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whether or not the case should be transferred to Massachusetts.

THE COURT: Help me to understand your assertions regarding the Delaware nexus here. Clearly, the bankruptcy proceeding has been pending here since 2000. That -- what aspect of that or anything else should compel me to honor the plaintiff's choice of forum to defer to it in these circumstances?

MR. TRACY: The way the rules work with respect to consideration of transfer is for the Court considering the transfer to look at a series of well-established factors, and there's some that are outside the 12 that are listed, but the very first factor is the plaintiff's choice of forum. If the plaintiff -- and here, we are the plaintiff. If the plaintiff chooses a forum that has jurisdiction, which we've done, then that's to remain the forum unless there's reason shown to change that.

Now, we did choose this forum, and we chose it for several reasons. We chose it because we appear here regularly, and it's a convenient forum for us in that respect. We chose it because this claim is the largest cause of -- largest asset of this estate and will affect how the estate continues to be administered.

We also chose it because one of the factors in determining whether or not a transfer should occur is the speed with which cases are handled in the respective jurisdictions,

and the cases in Bankruptcy Court move with a certain speed which is not matched in District Court anywhere by my experience in this court and other Bankruptcy Courts and in District Courts throughout the country, and, in fact, we attached I think as an amendment or an addendum or an exhibit to our motion a printout with respect to Judge Saris' average time of trial. And this is not a criticism of her. It's just a measure of the time that it takes for a case to work its way through District Court as opposed to Bankruptcy Court and a quick resolution of something that we have an interest in. So that's another reason why we chose this — this forum.

Another reason is that under the documents which authorize and empower the litigation trustee to bring this action, any settlement which may be reached must be approved by you. We must bring a claim before — file a motion before this Court for approval of any such settlement. In addition, KPMG, the moving party, is a — is an entity that's organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware.

So we have used those reasons, and that's why we first chose this particular venue, and with all due respect, I think it is up to KPMG to say that there are compelling reasons to move this from where we chose to bring the action to another jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Well, let's take a look at those reasons from your vantage point. You've acknowledged a substantial

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#### Argument - Trench

overlap at least in facts. You've asserted differences in legal theories, and indeed, there are other legal theories propounded in the other actions in terms of securities fraud and the like and some of the same causes as well.

What about those types of issues that have -- and nobody is talking about res judicata or collateral estoppel here. Obviously, the trustee of L&H was not a party to, nor L&H for that matter, to anything that was decided in Massachusetts, and I don't think there is question that the L&H trustee would have the opportunity to litigate any and all of those questions.

But when we're talking about questions involving, for instance, Belgium secrecy laws in connection with discovery demands, when we're talking about other aspects of international law that apparently have become familiar to Judge Saris and Judge Collings, isn't that a -- the kind of use of judicial resources that the first filed policy, whether or not it applies specifically to this case, was intended to foster?

MR. TRENCH: I think it's very close to that, Your Honor, but let me -- before I address those things directly, let me make a comment about the -- the status and the nature of the two cases. Because KPMG has effectively settled all of their claims and are only in the most nominal sense a party in those cases, there is no common party between this

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action and any of the pending Massachusetts actions.

THE COURT: Does that matter?

MR. TRENCH: Yes, it does, Your Honor, because we've looked and I think KPMG has looked, and we have never found a single case in the United States in which there is no common party between cases that has resulted in a transfer.

THE COURT: Do you think that the basic premises of the first filed rule are undercut to the extent that the principal of that rule should not be applied? In other words, you acknowledge that there is the same set of facts or virtually so. You -- and, by the way, KPMG was a party to those proceedings. It's not as if there -- you know, there's no connection in terms of the identification of parties by the vociferous nature of your memorandum which I will tell you probably crossed the line.

I was dismayed to read it I will tell you. The arguments are certainly sound and worthy of consideration, but the tone I would ask you to tone down, if you would.

MR. TRENCH: Of course.

THE COURT: But the basic concept that the facts and -- and some of the law are identical, doesn't that really dictate that there ought not to be a division of the -- the basic controversy, what happened with the collapse of L&H and the preceding events to that collapse, particularly the transactions involving Dragon and Dictaphone and KPMG's

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involvement, U.S. and Belgium, in that entire debacle. That's the fundamental nature of what's still there, what was there to begin with, what's still there even without KPMG and what's here in this case, is it not?

MR. TRENCH: Well, to some extent that's right, Your Honor, but as I understand the —— the factors that are to be weighed, they include judicial economy, which is what I think the matters that you discussed relate to, and judicial economy traditionally and often in transfer actions —— and I think when Judge Robinson transferred the four cases from Delaware means that there would —— if not for a transfer, there would be a party defending or prosecuting the —— virtually the same claim in two separate jurisdictions with the risk of duplication of discovery and inconsistent rulings.

Now, in this particular case, there -- that won't happen. Discovery is effectively closed in Massachusetts. There won't be inconsistent rulings, because there is no ruling that has involved L&H or the litigation trustee in Massachusetts.

THE COURT: No, there isn't, but there are rulings that I would probably be -- not -- perhaps not me, but perhaps the District Court if this were -- if the reference were withdrawn. Should the Belgium -- KPM, Belgium matter be transferred to Belgium on the ground of forum non conveniens, what are the impacts of the secrecy laws of Belgium on these

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matters, confidentiality orders apparently entered.

It may not be between the same parties, but there are identical -- as a matter of fact, one of the parties is the same. I suspect that KPMG, Belgium was involved in the motion to transfer venue to Belgium.

MR. TRENCII: Yes, Your Honor. They did move to dismiss for forum non conveniens. That motion was denied by Judge Saris. It was in connection with the motion to dismiss the securities fraud claims against a number of defendants, by a number of defendants, and Judge Saris did, in fact, determine that the allegations were sufficiently pled to meet the requirements of the securities act which are different requirements that we have, and there — there were other decisions relating to securities fraud standards which do not relate to us.

None of her decisions affected any of the causes of action or touched on any of the causes of action that we bring here. The closest that any of her decisions came to that was her — her order dismissing or granting a motion to dismiss an action brought by the Dictaphone trustee who did assert a Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act claim. She dismissed it, however, not because she considered that claim and found that it was wanting but because the Dictaphone trustee representing new Dictaphone was effectively seeking damages to old Dictaphone and didn't have standing to bring the action, and

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that's an entirely different issue from the issue of the L&H trustee who represents the former client of KPMG, LLP and KPMG, Belgium who's bringing a malpractice action based on that relationship, a breach of -- aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim based on that relationship and a violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act. We have an entirely different circumstance.

And you've mentioned the Belgium security -- secrecy act, and that's interesting, because that's an act which was created in Belgium to prohibit accountants and others from disclosing secrets of their clients and holding them liable for sanctions if they do it, and in the case in Massachusetts, the court found that there were exceptions to that act which allowed plaintiffs who were not in privity with either party to see those records and get those records, notwithstanding the fact that the Belgium secrecy act would appear to prohibit it.

In our case, Your Honor, there's something entirely different, something none of the courts approached, and that is there's an exception to the Belgium secrecy act which relates to consent by the client. Well, we're the client, and -- and if we seek these records and KPMG, Belgium says you can't see them because we are prohibited from the -- from the disclosure of these secret records, which are effectively records of L&H's representation, we will give consent to them to supply them to us, and none of the judges or magistrates consider that

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#### Argument - Trench

1 argument because those facts weren't present. That's a 2 different circumstance.

> So it's true that the magistrate and the court did consider that act in expert affidavits on Belgium law and did make rulings and, in fact, even enjoined KPMG, Belgium from seeking a -- the enforcement of a writ in Belgium to prevent the plaintiffs from getting those documents after the -- the Court in Massachusetts said they could.

Those things are all true, but we have a different position in this as we do in all the other claims. We are the former client, and the considerations as to whether or not that applies are new considerations, whether you make them, Judge Robinson makes them, Judge Saris makes them. They're going to be things that haven't been considered before.

THE COURT: I understand. Let me understand that you've acknowledged that some of the witnesses remain in Massachusetts. Others are in other places, as I recall, Houston, Atlanta, and the like.

> MR. TRENCH: Yeah.

THE COURT: Who's in Delaware?

MR. TRENCH: I don't think that there's -- there's a witness that we -- that we're aware of right now that's in Delaware, Your Honor, but the number of witnesses that are in Massachusetts is few, and we frankly don't know where all of the witnesses are until we do our discovery, but --

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#### Argument - Trench

THE COURT: Are the books and records of KPMG, U.S. in Massachusetts as well?

MR. TRENCH: I -- I do not know the answer to that, I mean, we have not been able to do any discovery yet. So where their books and records are I don't know. I do know that one of the prominent members of KPMG, U.S. is out of Dallas, and he is perhaps the most prominent of those who acted in this matter, and I expect that his records are -- are in I don't know the answer to that, but I don't know whether they're in -- in Massachusetts either.

I have heard -- well, I don't want to talk about what I've heard, because I -- I don't know the answer to that question.

THE COURT: Well, they've acknowledged that the -the alleged conduct by KPMG, U.S. at least occurred in Massachusetts.

MR. TRENCH: Your Honor, one of the things we pled and we assert is that the center of gravity of the conduct that forms the basis of our claims is in Massachusetts. We do plead that, and that was absolutely true.

That, however, I must point out, was an event that occurred in 1998, 1999, 2000 when L&H's U.S. headquarters were present in Massachusetts. We are now in 2004. L&H has no headquarters in Massachusetts, has no employees in Massachusetts, and that connection which caused the center of

gravity of the cause of action to be in Massachusetts is no longer a present fact. So for considering — for the consideration of transfer purposes, I think the Court must look at the way things are today on November 23, 2004, and that is that L&H has no presence in Massachusetts. It did back then, and that's significant for the cause of action, but today it does not.

In fact, L&H's presence is in the form of Scott

Baena, the litigation trustee who is in Miami but who does

travel to Delaware from time to time and, you know, that's -
that's the connection. It's no longer Massachusetts.

THE COURT: Understood. Let me offer the opportunity to KPMG to reply. Any other comments?

MS. NGUYEN: Your Honor, with respect to the location of documents, the allegations that the plaintiffs have made is that the auditing functions here occurred in Massachusetts.

KPMG, U.S. has a Boston, Massachusetts office, and its work papers with respect to the work that it performed are, you know, collected and reside in Boston, Massachusetts.

We have a number of witnesses who work in the office who are still located in Massachusetts, and the fact that the -- you know, the plaintiffs point out that discovery has closed in the Massachusetts action would not be relevant with respect to discovery should the Court decide that discovery could proceed against the litigation trust in Massachusetts, because

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they would be on a separate schedule, and there are other parties that are on -- on a different scheduling, including the Dictaphone litigation trust. So it's not true that fact discovery would apply here and preclude the litigation trust from conducting discovery.

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. TRENCH: Your Honor, may I make a comment about Because I think there's a misunderstanding about what our position on that is.

THE COURT: Last comment. Go ahead.

MR. TRENCH: We -- we have not contended that we would be precluded from discovery by virtue of a transfer to Massachusetts. What we have asserted is there would be no economy of discovery by virtue of the transfer to Massachusetts. Whatever discovery we would take would be new discovery, whether it's in Massachusetts or in Delaware.

So the economy as it relates to the parties, to the Court, and to the witnesses is not present and is not a factor in -- in the transfer. That's the point that we were trying to make.

THE COURT: Understood. Let me reflect that we are working on a -- the defendant's motion to transfer the venue to Massachusetts. This action charges the defendants, we all know, with violations of Massachusetts law, with breach of fiduciary duties and with fraud in connection with serving as

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accountants for L&H, L&H which collapsed in 2000 after purchasing two other entities, Dragon and Dictaphone.

The -- it is asserted by the defendants that the same underlying facts have been extensively litigated in Massachusetts. There are various actions, including shareholder actions, pending in Massachusetts. The defendants apparently have settled their cases in Massachusetts and are no longer active in the cases as of late, but the cases are still pending.

Of course, our framework for deciding these issues starts with Bankruptcy Rule 7087 which refers to 28 U.S.C. Section 1412 which poses the opportunity to transfer venue, "..in the interest of justice or the convenience of the parties." Seems to be that in this context, both of those prongs favor the transfer of venue in this case, and the most critical aspect of why that's so is the commonality of facts that is actually acknowledged by the plaintiff here, the fact that those cases, which have been pending for four years in Massachusetts, deal with the collapse of L&H, the role of the -- of, among others, KPMG, U.S. and Belgium in formulating the financial statements for 1998 and 1999 and 2000, for being involved in the transactions involving Dragon and Dictaphone and their involvement in the collapse of L&H. Those common facts I think compel the conclusion that the convenience of the parties and the interests of justice favor the transfer.

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Indeed, we have it is recognized Massachusetts State law issues and Massachusetts as the center of gravity for this complaint. Of course, the plaintiff is right. The trustee is correct that a bankruptcy court or a district court let's say in Delaware would, of course, be qualified and able to apply the state laws of another jurisdiction. That's not fundamental, but I take note of it.

In passing, I note as well that there is really no nexus to Delaware here, the fact that the trustee is accustomed to coming to Delaware occasionally is not sufficient nexus, although clearly, there is a jurisdiction by the fact that the -- the bankruptcy is still pending and the -- and KPMG we note is a Delaware corporation. But basically, other than the bankruptcy, there are witnesses still in Massachusetts. The exact number is unknown, certainly witnesses in other places as well, but not Delaware.

It appears at first blush, although it's not pivotal to this decision, that at least some of the books and records are located in Massachusetts. It seems to me that the import of this -- the import of the first filed rule really compels this case to be situated in Massachusetts, and it is a question of judicial economy and the appropriate designation of judicial resources.

There is a learning curve when we talk about Belgian secrecy laws, even if we understand, as counsel for the

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# The Court - Decision

plaintiff has described, that the issues in terms of applying, for instance, those Belgium secrecy laws, may be different here because it is L&H, the actual client who is asserting the cause of action. Never the less, the familiarity with those matters does involve a learning curve as other matters do as well, matters that have been litigated for an extensive period of time in Massachusetts.

I do not take -- I don't consider the trustee's position that it is more likely that the case will be -- will have a speedier result in the Bankruptcy Court in Delaware or the District Court in Delaware for that matter than it would in Massachusetts. In fact, contrary speculation might be in order in light of the learning curve that has already been traversed by the Massachusetts District Court.

Plaintiff is certainly correct that some deference to its choice of forum is appropriate, but it seems to me that that deference is substantially outweighed here by the pendency of the Massachusetts actions which overlap to such a great extent in terms of factual underpinnings as well as certain legal concepts that might be applicable to discovery and to substance.

It seems to me that Judge Robinson in the Filler case, that her rational for applying the first filed rule is applicable here as well. Indeed, KPMG was common to each of the I think three matters that were the subject of

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Judge Robinson's review in the Filler case, but I think her rational applies -- I think the first filed rule applies even if there are different parties, but even if it doesn't, the basic concept that the rules, quote, encourages sound judicial administration and promotes comity among Federal Courts -that's from the decision, and I omit the quotes -- is applicable here as well, and I quote further --

> "The decision to transfer or stay the second action is within the discretion of the trial court. However, invocation of the rule will usually be the norm, not the exception. Courts must be presented with exceptional circumstances before exercising their discretion to depart from the first filed rule."

And Judge Robinson noted that where you have the same set of facts, although not necessarily the same claims that there is compelling reason for invoking the rule, for granting a motion to transfer.

It seems to me that the other concerns expressed by the trustee do not overcome this conclusion. The fact that KPMG, U.S. and Belgium have settled all their claims in Massachusetts does not defeat this cause. proposition is that there has been a substantial emersion in the facts of this scenario by the judicial team in Massachusetts, and that needs to be capped to resolve this

The Court - Decision

matter as expeditiously as possible.

So nor is it a concern that discovery has closed in Massachusetts and that no consolidation of discovery is possible. It is understood that the trustee will pursue, will not doubt have the chance to pursue discovery, but the discovery issues which are complex and out of the norm in this case, at least in some degree, I think will be better handled in terms of the familiarity with -- with the underpinnings and the opportunity to be in harmony with the other decisions.

The trustee will have every opportunity to assert its own positions. I have no, of course, as the trustee asserts in his papers, he and the plaintiff are entitled to impartial consideration, and I have no doubt that they will get it. The entire import of the first filed rule has no room for concern about prejudgments or ideas that impressions about a case are formed by the first judge who has those cases. We all I'm sure have enough faith in the system, and in particular, judges to understand that they have the capacity and then some to face each set of parties with the positions that they take and to resolve their disputes in an impartial way.

So for those reasons, I will enter an order granting the motion of KPMG, U.S. for transfer of venue to the District of Massachusetts. I'm not sure if a form of order has been submitted.

MR. FALLON: Your Honor, this is Brad Fallon. There

THE COURT: Bye bye.

MR. TRENCH: Bye bye.

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The Court - Decision

(Hearing Adjourned)

MAUREEN EMMONS

DIANA DOMAN TRANSCRIBING

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CERTIFICATION

I, Maureen Emmons, court approved transcriber, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Date: 10/15/04

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